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By Virginia C. Thomas
Of Plain English and Plain Meaning
n increasing number of jurists 
have a passion for plain Eng-
lish—and they are not afraid 
to talk about it. Pivotal events 
in the plain English movement in Michigan 
date back to the development of court forms 
by the District Judges Forms Committee in 
the mid-1970s.1 Judge Frederick G. Mather, 
then president of the District Judges Associ-
ation, is credited with initiating the develop-
ment of recommended general forms un-
der the District Court Rules.2 Today, judges 
at the state and federal levels regularly ex-
press their views on plain English inside 
and outside of their judicial opinions. Some 
even have used a different approach to inter-
preting statutory language. These are some 
of their stories.
Opinions on (and in) opinions
In a recent interview, Judge Richard 
Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit reflected on the use of le-
gal jargon in court opinions.3 In his view, 
judges should avoid legalese. Regarding 
the term arguendo, for example, the judge 
posits, “[W]hy on earth would you use the 
Latin word when you have a perfectly good 
English substitution?”4
Posner’s approach supports access to 
justice:
One thing that’s troublesome is that there 
are a great many litigants who do not have 
lawyers and I think to not have a lawyer 
and to be involved in a lawsuit is very, very 
difficult. But it’s made more difficult if 
what the judges say, whether orally or in 
writing, is in an esoteric, professional dis-
course that laypeople don’t understand.5
He has not confined his views to legal 
commentary. In a recent case, United States 
v Dessart,6 he issued a concurring opinion 
that questioned “some of the verbal formu-
las in the majority opinion” such as the use 
of hyperbole, metaphor, and other rhetorical 
devices. He concluded, “Everything judges 
do can be explained in straightforward lan-
guage—and should be.”7
On a different aspect of clear commu-
nication, Judge Laurence Silberman of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
criticized the use of abbreviations and acro-
nyms by attorneys for both parties in a re-
cent case. His ruling in National Association 
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v U.S. 
Department of Energy 8 included a footnote 
stating that the attorneys “abandoned any 
attempt to write in plain English, instead 
abbreviating every conceivable agency and 
statute involved, familiar or not . . . .”9 In a 
subsequent case, he reportedly told the at-
torneys that they had not read the pertinent 
court rules and described their overuse of 
acronyms as “painful.”10
This kind of thing frustrates even the 
most experienced law librarians, particu-
larly when the acronyms are not familiar 
or readily found. Reliance on even com-
monly used acronyms can give rise to some 
pretty peculiar interpretations. For exam-
ple, stricken on leave is abbreviated SOL, 
as is statute of limitations and sadly outta 
luck (in the polite form).11 Time to bring out 
the Bieber’s !12
Potholes or pavement failures?
Sometimes, judges make a practice of 
speaking truth to power outside of court 
opinions. Mark P. Painter, now retired from 
the bench, served as an Ohio Court of Ap-
peals judge from 1995 to 2009, when he 
was elected to the United Nations Appeals 
Tribunal by the General Assembly. Painter 
has been an ardent advocate of good legal 
writing throughout his career. He has writ-
ten three books and more than 100 columns 
on the subject13 and has taught advanced 
legal writing.
Painter is respected for his direct, fer-
vent commentary on plain English tempered 
with a sense of humor. For example, one of 
his latest columns highlighted the follow-
ing example of “amok” words:
Quantas airlines got [Plain English Foun-
dation] prizes in both [2013] and 2014. In 
2013, Quantas described a near-collision 
as a loss of separation. For 2014, Quantas 
explained the cause of a flight delay as a 
pavement failure. There was a pothole in 
the runway that had to be filled in before 
the plane could take off.14
From legal writing to  
statutory interpretation
Good legal writing, whether used to craft 
arguments in a brief or write a motion for 
A
Good legal writing, whether used to craft 
arguments in a brief or write a motion for 
summary judgment, is essential to the practice 
of law.
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summary judgment, is essential to the prac-
tice of law. Which tools are appropriate for 
courts to use in interpreting the ordinary 
meaning of legislative language continues to 
be a matter of debate among judges. In a re-
cent Utah Supreme Court case, State v Ras-
about,15 the majority and concurring justices 
disagreed as to whether the Court should 
use a “corpus linguistics analysis”16 to deter-
mine the meaning of the statutory phrase 
unlawful discharge of a firearm. Should 
each of 12 shots fired by the defendant con-
stitute a discrete discharge of the weapon 
and carry a separate conviction or should 
all 12 be consolidated in a single count?
The Court considered the derivation of 
discharge as well as the statutory context, 
dictionary definition, and commonsense 
meaning of the term. It determined that 
discharge referred to each shot fired—and 
each shot constituted a separate violation, 
affirming the appeals court.
Now for the rest of the story. In the ma-
jority opinion, Utah Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Parrish also admonished Associate 
Chief Justice Lee for his concurring opin-
ion, which “charges the court with coming 
to this conclusion by plucking a definition 
from a dictionary on the basis of cloaked 
intuition.”17 Lee defended his position, argu-
ing that dictionaries are also compiled from 
linguistic corpora, which may be useful to 
courts for statutory interpretation. He was 
simply applying a new tool to the process.
Earlier this year, the Michigan Supreme 
Court encountered a similar challenge in 
People v Harris.18 The Court addressed the 
question of whether the Disclosures by Law 
Enforcement Officers Act (DLEOA)19 bars 
the state from using the defendant law en-
forcement officers’ false statements made 
during an earlier internal affairs investiga-
tion against them in the context of a pend-
ing criminal proceeding. Did the term infor-
mation in the statute include false as well 
as true statements?
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed 
the Court of Appeals. In delivering the ma-
jority opinion of the Court, Justice Zahra 
wrote, “The plain language of the DLEOA 
controls our resolution of this dispute and 
compels us to agree with defendants.”20 As 
in Rasabout, the Harris Court considered 
the ordinary meaning of a term—in this case, 
information. It examined the term in its stat-
utory context and checked the definition 
from three dictionaries. Unlike the Rasabout 
Court, however, the Harris Court did apply 
corpus linguistics analysis to the task. The 
selected database, Corpus of Contemporary 
American English, provided definitional and 
contextual data that “strongly suggests that 
the unmodified word ‘information,’ can de-
scribe either true or false statements.”21
In Harris, the Supreme Court specifically 
criticized legislative analyses prepared by 
Michigan House and Senate staff for their 
lack of interpretive use or persuasive value.22 
The Court chose instead to use empirical 
data to interpret legislative language. Cor-
pus linguistics analysis supersedes legisla-
tive analyses in this case. We may be see-
ing a new direction in the search for plain 
meaning in Michigan statutory law. n
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